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PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
LITIGATION: THE PLAINTIFF'S
PERSPECTIVE
SUSAN E. LOGGANS*
INTRODUCTION

The nature of air disasters creates extremely complex litigation. 1 In addition to the staggering quantum of money and time
involved in discovery, 2 proof of facts in such cases is often difficult. The popular view is that the complexity of aviation cases
results primarily from the necessity of technical proofs. The
truth, however, is that the major problem presented by an aviation disaster case lies not in the proof of liability, but in the issue
of damages.
At the foundation of the Anglo-American concept of damages is the notion of compensation for loss or injury attributable
to the wrongdoer. 3 In civil suits, recovery of damages is limited
only by the established loss or injury sustained by the plaintiff.
Measured by this standard of recovery, awards of damages in
domestic air disaster cases have been unprecedented in
amount. 4 Yet, this is not the case in international air crash liti* J.D. DePaul University College of Law, 1974. The author is presently
the Chairman of the Aviation Law Section of the Chicago Bar Association
and the Secretary of the Aviation Law Section of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America. A member of the Lawyer-Pilots Bar Association, she
is also the Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Aviation and Space Law,
Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation, of the American Bar
Association.
1. "The many reported decisions involving airplane accidents reveal
that the proper preparation and presentation of such a case involves matters of a complicated technical nature and requires the benefits of expert
guidance." Branyan v. KLM, 13 F.R.D. 425, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
2. See generally 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAws ch. 26
(1978) [hereinafter cited as KREINDLER]; Loggans, Aviation Discovery: The
Herculean Task, 14 TRIAL 40 (1978).
3. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 560 (1935).
4. Because death or severe injury is the unfortunate but common result of an airplane crash, the subject of damages assumes a special importance in the field of aviation litigation. The last twenty years have
witnessed considerable development in the methods of bringing the facts of
the case and the nature of the loss to the jury, as well as the theory of valuation proposed by the plaintiff. Demonstrative evidence, coupled with the
growing use of experts in proving damages, has resulted in more respon-
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gation.
Considerations in the interest of international comity and
private enterprise have placed limitations on the recovery of
damages by international air passengers. In a commercial aviation accident, international agreements may restrict the amount
of damages recovered regardless of the severity of the injury
suffered by the plaintiff. These international agreements have5
come to be known as the Warsaw Convention and its progeny.
Due to the broad definition of "international travel" propounded by the drafters of the Convention, 6 air travel that may
seem purely domestic may in fact fall within the rigid limitations of that treaty. In fact, two Americans seated next to each
other on a commercial flight from Chicago to Bloomington, Indiana may be entitled to recover widely disparate awards of damages as a result of the application of the Warsaw Convention.
Thus, any plaintiffs attorney who becomes involved in air disaster litigation is advised to acquaint himself, or herself, with the
law of international air travel.
Because domestic air crash litigation is controlled by the
same tort principles prevailing in other personal injury cases,
this article will discuss only international aviation accident litigation. Initially, the history of the international agreements
which govern the amount of recoverable damages will be examined. Subsequently, those cases which fall within the purview of the agreements or treaties, as well as those which
sive, reasonable, and yet significantly higher verdicts. See Belli, Demonstrative Evidence, 10 Wyo. L.J. 15 (1955).

In a study conducted by the Civil Aeronautics Board [CAB], over 48%
of the non-Warsaw death settlements for 1970 arising from aviation litigation exceeded $200,000. The trend reported by the CAB is toward increasingly higher awards in such cases. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, LEVEL OF
RECOVERY ON ACCOUNT OF PASSENGER DEATH AND SERIOUS INJURIES IN
PLANE ACCIDENTS (1970).

AIR-

5. Warsaw Convention, opened for signature, Dec. 12, 1929, 49 Stat.
3000, T.S. No. 876. Article 22 provides in pertinent part that " [i] n the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger shall
be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs [$8,291]." The Hague Protocol, an
agreement to which the United States is not a party, has increased that
limit for some international travel to $16,582. 2 INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AvATION ORGANIZATION,

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE Am LAW 1

(Doc. 7686-LC/140)(1956), W. EXEC. Doc. No. H, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1959).
Currently, the limitation on recovery for a passenger in an international
air disaster is $75,000 where the flight had significant contact with the
United States. This is provided for in the Order of the Civil Aeronautics
Board Approving Increases in Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention
and Hague Protocol, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970). This order is known as the
Montreal Agreement.
6. Article 1(2) of the Warsaw Convention defines "international transportation." See note 27 and accompanying text infra.

19801

Personal Injury Damages

constitute exceptions to their application, will be discussed. Fi-

nally, the constitutionality of the damage limitations created by
the agreements and an argument based upon contract law will
be analyzed. Throughout, methods of procuring full compensation for the plaintiff will be sought.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1925 and in 1929, representatives of many major commercial nations met in Paris and Warsaw. Their twofold goal was
(1) to unify the law of international aviation, and (2) to protect
the fledgling airline industry from the potentially debilitating effect of unlimited liability in the event of a disaster. 7 The result
of these two international conferences was the Warsaw Convention,8 which has since been the dominant consideration in international aviation accident litigation. The United States was not
a party to these conventions, but it did send an observer to
them. In 1934, however, the United States became an official adherent to the Convention, 9 adopting its provisions as part of the
supreme law of the land.'0
7. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 387, 314 N.E.2d 848,
851, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (1974) ("The primary objectives of the Convention
are to establish uniform rules of documentation in air transportation and to
limit liability of the air carrier in case of accident.").
See generally Lowenfeld &Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REV. 497, 498-501 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn] (authors present an excellent documentation of
the United States' involvement in, and adherence to, the Warsaw Convention from its creation through the adoption of its several amendments).
8. Warsaw Convention, opened for signature, Dec. 12, 1929, 49 Stat.
3000, T.S. No. 876. See note 6 supra.
9. Article 38 of the Warsaw Convention provides that:
(1) This convention shall, after it has come into force, remain open
for adherence by any state.
(2) The adherence shall be effected by a notification addressed to
the Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall inform the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties thereof.
(3) The adherence shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after
the notification made to the Government of the Republic of Poland.
49 Stat. at 3023, T.S. No. 876.
In 1934, the President submitted the treaty to the Senate, which gave its
advice and consent by voice vote on June 15, 1934. 78 CONG. REC. 11,582
(1934). The United States, pursuant to Article 38 of the Convention, deposited its instrument of adherence on July 31, 1934; the President proclaimed
adherence only three months later. 49 Stat. 3000, T. S. No. 876 (1934).
10. A treaty ratified by the Senate, U. S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1, or an
international agreement entered into pursuant to valid executive authority,
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), is the supreme law of the land.
See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327 (1937) (Court in reviewing the applicability of Soviet-United States agreement to New York civil
suit held that the international treaty must take precedence over New York
law); Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 808 (1946) (treaty, valid under the federal Constitution,
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The core of the Convention is its limitation of liability. In its
original form, the treaty limited an airline's liability for death or

personal injury to approximately $8,300 per passenger."

Al-

though this ceiling on recovery was a sharp departure from common law tort principles and could produce harsh results, quid
pro quo was the rationale suggested by its proponents. 12 The
passenger relinquished his right to recovery in excess of $8,300,

and the carrier became saddled with a presumption of liability
for any injury occurring while the passenger was embarking, on
board, or disembarking the aircraft, unless the carrier proved its
exercise of due care. 13 In addition, the carrier was not permitted
to limit its liability beyond that provided by the treaty's restricmust be regarded as part of law of state and may override power of state
over the great body of private relations which usually fall within its control); Kelly v. Sabena Belgium World Airlines, 242 F. Supp. 129, 145
(E.D.N.Y. 1965) ("The Convention, and the limitations therein, is the law of
the land and must be applied, nonwithstanding contrary state law or public

policy.").
11. 49 Stat. at 3019, T.S. No. 876. Article 22 of the Convention also limits
the air carrier's liability for loss of personal belongings and baggage. This
article, however, will discuss only the issue of damages resulting from injury or death.
It should be noted that the Convention does not apply to the passenger's rights against the aircraft manufacturer. The limitations apply only to
the carrier and may not be asserted as a defense in an action against other

defendants.
12. "Though the carriers receive the chief benefit from Warsaw, the passenger was not entirely neglected ....
[T] he essential bargain was a shift
in the burden of proof in return for a limit of liability (except in cases of
wilful misconduct) set at 8,300 dollars per person." Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supranote 7, at 500. But see Comment, The Warsaw Treaty: The Quid
Pro Quo, 29 U. Prrr. L. REV. 253, 256-58 (1967) (the student author noted that
the tradeoff between the passenger and the air carrier may be inequitable
in modern times, especially with the advent and extensive use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in air crash cases).
13. "For all practical purposes the Warsaw Convention creates a presumption of liability of the carrier, up to a limited amount." KREmDLER,

supra note 2, at § 11.02.

The presumption arises from the language of the following three arti-

cles of the Convention. Article 17 states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by
a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking.
49 Stat. at 3018, T.S. No. 876.
Article 20 provides that the carrier shall not be liable if it proves due

care on its part. Finally Article 21 allows the carrier to escape liability,
wholly or in part, if it can prove the contributory negligence of the passen-

ger. Id. at 3019, T.S. No. 876.

For a complete discussion of the presumption of liability which derives
from Articles 17, 20, and 21, see Hjalsted, The Air Carrier'sLiability in Cases
of Unknown Cause of Damage in InternationalAir Law, 27 J. ArR L. & COM.
1 (1960).
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tions.
In the years after the United States adherence to the Convention, it became increasingly clear that the limits placed on
liability had been set too low. In the United States, Great Britain, France, and other developed countries, awards in personal
injury and death actions far exceeded the recovery amounts permitted by the Warsaw Convention.' 5 It was argued that the airline industry had become stable and profitable and no longer
6
needed the protection of the Warsaw limit.'
In a 1955 international convention at the Hague, many of the
Warsaw adherents and signatories voiced their differences. Debate centered on Article 22's $8,300 limitation on recovery. 17 The
United States supported a $25,000 per passenger limit, but this
proposal was vehemently opposed by many of the less developed countries, and a $16,000 maximum was settled upon.' 8
Other modifications of the Warsaw Convention were adopted,
and the agreements became known collectively as the Hague
Protocol. The United States, a strong advocate of many of the
modifications, signed the agreement, but ironically it has never
14. Article 23 provides in pertinent part "[a]ny provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid
down in this convention shall be null and void...
" 49 Stat. at 3020, T.S.
No. 876.
15. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 7, at 504.
16. Id. See also Beaumont, Liability of InternationalAir Carriers,97
L.J. 643 (1947); Rhyne, InternationalLaw Air Transportation,47 MICH. L.
REV.

41, 54-61 (1948).

17. Calkins, Grand Canyon, Warsaw and the Hague Protocol, 23 J. Am
L & COM. 253, 262 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Calkins] ("By far the most
important issue considered by the Conference, and the one on which most
debate was had, was the matter of limitation of liability for passenger death
or personal injury."); Reiber, Ratification of the Hague Protocol: Its Relation to the Uniform InternationalAir CarrierLiabilityLaw Achieved by the
Warsaw Convention, 23 J. Am. L. & COM. 272, 282 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
Reiber] ("The provision in the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol

which stirs the greatest controversy and overshadows, in the debate of
those agreements ...

is the limitation on the liability of carriers for per-

sonal injury.").

18. Hague Protocol, art. XI. 2 INTERNATON CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAw 8 (Doc. 7686LC/1140) (1956), S. EXEc. Doc. No. H., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1959). Effective August 1, 1963, the Hague Protocol modifies the Warsaw Convention by
increasing the maximum liability of airlines in international travel to

$16,582, exactly double the Warsaw limitation. In addition, paragraph 4 in
Article XI provides that notwithstanding these limits, the expenses in litiga-

tion incurred by the plaintiff may also be recovered. The additional recovery is subject to the condition that the damages, excluding litigation costs,

not exceed the amount offered by the carrier as settlement within six
months after the date of the accident, or before the commencement of the
action, whichever is later. This provision was included in order to induce
quick settlements and avoid litigation. See generally Calkins, supra note
17; Ereli, The Hague Protocol: An Abuse of Discretion, 11 U.C.L.A. L.

358 (1964); Reiber, supra note 17.

REV.
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been ratified by the Senate as required by the United States
Constitution. 19
The doubling of the Warsaw limit by the Hague Protocol
failed to mollify an increasingly angry American bar and
bench. 20 As a result of this dissatisfaction, the United States
filed articles of denouncement, as provided by the Convention,
on November 15, 1965.21 The denunciation was to become effective after six months. American criticism of the liability limitations of the Convention had reached its apex. In early 1966, the
International Civil Aviation Organization held a conference in
Montreal in an effort to avert America's withdrawal from the
Convention. Representatives of the State Department and
sixty-one individual American airlines agreed to attend. After
arduous bargaining and compromise, the major airlines of the
world agreed to waive the limitation of liability in Article 22 up
19. KREINDLER, supra note 2, at § 12.01. The failure by the United States
to adhere to the Protocol is of minor significance. Mr. Kreindler states:
As between adherents to the Hague Protocol, and adherents to the Warsaw Convention, not amended by the Hague Protocol, there is nothing
in the Protocol that would render the unamended Convention ineffective. Thus, for all practical purposes, the Warsaw Convention, unamended by the Hague Protocol, would continue to be effective.

Id. at § 12.0313].

20. In response to the severe limitations, courts began to find more
cases within the exceptions to the Convention. See, e.g., KLM Airlines v.
Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (appellate court affirmed district court's
finding of wilful misconduct on the part of the carrier and upheld the
$350,000 award); Burdell v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 11 Av. Cas. 17,351 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. 1969) (Illinois Circuit Court of Cook County found the Convention
inapplicable on various grounds and sustained the award of $210,000). See
also National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959); Gannon v.
American Airlines, Inc., 251 F.2d 476 (10th Cir. 1958); Reuter v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 226 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1955).
21. Article 39 provides:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this
convention by a notification addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall at once inform the Government of each of
the High Contracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification
of denunciation, and shall operate only as regards the party which shall
have proceeded to denunciation.
49 Stat. at 3022, T.S. No. 876.
In accordance with this provision, the United States gave notice of its
denunciation, to become effective six months later. The press release by
the State Department cited as its reason the low limit on recovery for passenger deaths or personal injuries. It contained an ultimatum, however,
which stated that the United States would withdraw its denunciation if,
prior to its effective date, a $100,000 limitation would be reasonably forthcoming, with a $75,000 provisional interim agreement. 53 DEP'T STATE BULL.
923 (1965).
See generally S. SPEICER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAw § 11:19
(1978) [hereinafter cited as AViATION TORT LAW]; Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. Am L. & CoM. 291 (1965).
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to $75,000.22 In countries which permit the recovery of signifi23
cant legal fees and costs, the limit was set at $58,000 plus costs.
The United States withdrew its renunciation of the Warsaw
Convention on May 14, 1966, the day before it was to take effect. 24 The embodiment of the revisions to the Convention,

known as the Montreal Interim Agreement, 25 presently governs
the liability of air carriers whenever any location in the United
States is a point of origin or destination, or an agreed stopping
place. Thus, for the averge American traveling internationally,
the Montreal Interim Agreement controls the liability of the car26
rier in accident litigation.
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL

The threshold question which should be asked by the aviation litigator is whether his client was engaged in international
travel. The provisions of the Warsaw Convention (and of the
documents that amend it) apply exclusively to "international
travel" as defined by Article 1(2):
[A]ny transportation in which, according to the contract made by
the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High
22. C.A.B. 18,900 (1965), reprinted in KREINDLER, supra note 2, at
§ 12A.03.
23. Id. The air carriers were required to file a tariff with the Civil Aeronautics Board raising the liability limits and waiving the defenses in Article,
20(1) of the Convention.
(1) The limit of liability for each passenger for death, wounding or
other bodily injury shall be the sum of US $75,000 inclusive of legal fees
and costs, except that, in case of a claim brought in a State where provision is made for separate award of legal fees and costs, the limit shall be
the sum of US $58,000 exclusive of legal fees and costs.
(2) The carrier shall not, with respect to any claim arising out of the
death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a passenger, avail itself of
any defense under Article 20(1) of said Convention or said Convention
as amended by said Protocol.
49 Stat. at 3019, T.S. No. 876.
24. C.A.B. 19,800 (1966).
25. 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970).
26. See note 5 supra. Shortly after the effective date of the Montreal
Interim Agreement the Civil Aeronautics Board adopted the agreement as

controlling the liability limitations in international air transportation having
"contact" with the United States. Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1968), reprintedin KREINDLER,
supra note 2, at § 12A.06.
There will be occasions when the Montreal Interim Agreement will not
apply to cases where American passengers have been injured or killed.
Where the American passenger is traveling extensively abroad, or is a resident of another country (where the travel has no "contact" with the United
States), the Warsaw Convention's $8,300 or amended $16,600 limitation may
apply.
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Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another 7power, even though that power is not a party to this convention.Air travel that would normally be considered domestic may be
"international" under the Convention. Since it is the provisions
of the individual airline ticket, and not the character of the particular flight, which are dispositive of the issue, two passengers
on the same flight may be subject to two entirely different bod29
8
ies of law. 2 The inequities are apparent.
Article 1(2) focuses on the points of departure and destination. Without exception, if the limitations of the Convention are
to apply, both places must be within the sovereignty of a High
Contracting Party.3 0 Consider the following variations:
27. 49 Stat. at 3014, T.S. No. 876. A country is a High Contracting Party if
it complies with the distinct prerequisites set forth in Article 38 of the
treaty which reads:
(1) This Convention shall, after it has come into force, remain open for
adherence by any state.
(2) The adherence shall be effected by a notification addressed to the
Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall inform the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties thereof.
(3) The adherence shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after the
notification made to the Government of the Republic of Poland.
49 Stat. at 3022, T.S. No. 876.
28. Tolson v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 335, 338
(S.D. Tex. 1975) (The determination of whether or not it is 'international
transportation' is made by reference to the flight ticket of the appropriate
individual passenger); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702,
705 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975) (International carriage
is primarily a function of the intention of the parties, as expressed in the
ticket or contract).
29. The provisions of Article 1(2) have been subject to attack by many
of the commentators. Kreindler states:
This definition of "international travel" occasionally leads to preposterous results. On the Eastern Airlines Electra aircraft that crashed in
Boston on October 4, 1960, one of the passengers had a ticket which
showed twelve different flights. He had started from New York City
and flew to Boston. From Boston, he was to make successive trips
throughout the United States, all of which were completely domestic,
except for one flight from Cleveland to Toronto and a succeeding flight
from Toronto back to a city in the United States. The crash in which he
was killed was his second flight out of New York, and was simply Boston to Philadelphia. Yet, because the eleventh and twelfth flights
shown on his ticket came within the definitions of "international travel"
under the Warsaw Convention, his estate and beneficiaries were limited to $8,300.00 under the Convention.
KREN'DLER, supra note 2, at § 11.05.

30. See note 27 supra. Kreindler elaborates: "Note that under the language of the Convention there is one place of departure and one place of
destination. This obviously refers to the entire trip, and not to the place of
departure and destination of a particular flight, which might constitute only
part of the overall trip." KREMnDLER, supra note 2, at § 11.0511]. See also
Burdell v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 11 Av. Cas. 17,351 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1969) (des-

19801

Personal Injury Damages

(1) Passenger'sticket reads "New York to Paris." This is the simplest fact pattern; the place of departure (United States) and the
point of destination (France) are both High Contracting Parties,
and therefore Passenger is an international traveler.
(2) Passenger'sticket reads "New York to Chicago to Los Angeles
to Detroit to Paris." In this case, as above, the points of departure
(United States) and destination (France) are High Contracting
Parties. The fact that there are "agreed stopping places" does not
affect the character of the agreement. If an accident should occur
on a domestic leg of the journey, e.g., between New York and Chicago, Passenger would be considered an international traveler
under the terms of the Warsaw Convention.
(3) Passenger's ticket reads "New York to Cuba to New York."
Cuba is not a High Contracting Party. However, Article 1(2) provides that even where the points of departure and destination are
within the territory of the same High Contracting Party, if there is
an agreed stopping place in another sovereignty, whether or not
that country is a signatory, then the entire journey is considered
international travel. Note
that the place of stopover need not be a
31
High Contracting Party.
(4). Passenger'sticket reads "New York to Cuba." Here, the point
of destination is not a High Contracting Party, and therefore the
Warsaw Convention is not applicable. There is no damage limitation. Note that had Passenger arranged for return to New York he
would be an international traveler as in variation (3) above, and his
recovery would be severely limited in case of injury.
(5) Passenger'sticket reads "New York to Paris to Cuba." Here,
as in (4), the point of destination is not within the territory of a
High Contracting Party. Therefore, the Convention does not apply.
An accident on the way to Paris from New York would fall outside
the Convention's "jurisdiction."
(6) Passenger'sticket reads "New York to Cuba to Paris." As in
example (3), the points of departure and destination are High Contination is determined not by one leg of the journey, but rather by the entire
contract of carriage); Bowen v. Port of Auth. of N.Y., 8 Av. Cas. 18,043 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1964) (destination is the last stop according to the contract of carriage, not where intermediate stops are made).
31. See Doering v. Scandanavian Airlines Sys., 329 F. Supp. 1081 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (where point of origin and destination is the same High Contracting Party, with stops in other sovereign lands, provisions of the Convention are invoked); Kelley v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 242 F. Supp.
129, 144-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) ("IElach of the passengers involved in this action was travelling on a round trip ticket from a point within the United
States to cities in Europe and return to the United States. Each ticket...
thus provided for 'International' transportation under that part of Article
1(2) ... .
Where there is a true break in the journey, the applicability of the Convention is determined when travel is resumed. Thus, if a passenger remained in Cuba for an extended period, the Convention might not limit his
recovery for injuries'incurred during a Cuba-Paris flight. Whether a "stopover" in the territory of another sovereignty which is not a High Contracting
Party will be considered merely a stop-over or a true break in the journey
will depend on the intent of the passenger and carrier. Article 1(3) defines
transportation as undivided if it has been regarded by the parties as a "single operation."
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tracting Parties and thus the Convention controls,
32 regardless of
whether the stopover is in a non-signatory nation.
The potential inconsistencies and injustices are legion. The
damages which may be recovered by survivors of the victims of
a single commercial air crash case will vary according to their
tickets, even though they may be able to prove similar economic
losses at trial. 33 For example, it seems inequitable that the
amount of recoverable damages should vary so widely depending on whether the passenger who books a flight from New York
to Havana also arranges a return flight to New York at the same
time. It is equally unfair that a passenger on a purely domestic
flight should be severely limited in his right to recover for an
injury merely because he is scheduled to fly internationally at
some future date. In 1967, 2 percent of all passengers on domestic flights were subject to the Warsaw Convention.34 In light of
decreased regulation of the airline industry, and increasingly
common international travel, this percentage has grown considerably. 35 Thus, it is imperative that the diligent plaintiff's attorney make efforts to discover and scrutinize the contract of
carriage. If the plaintiff is found to be an international traveler
within the meaning of Article 1(2), other provisions of the convention must be examined.
ARTICLE 17: A FERTILE GROUND FOR LITIGATION

An "accident" is a fortuitous event which does not take
place according to the usual course of things.3 6 Normally, where
32. See, e.g., Wyman v. Pan American Airlines, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43

N.Y.S.2d 420 (1943), affd, 267 A.D. 947, 48 N.Y.S. 2d 459 (1944) (where the
contract for carriage reflects international travel in that the points of departure and destination are two High Contracting Parties, then a diversion to a

sovereign nation, not an adherent to the Convention, will not vitiate the international character of the travel).
33. See generally KENNELLY, LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES

ch. 3 (1963); Kennelly, Aviation Law: InternationalAir Travel - A Brief
Diagnosis and Prognosis, 56 CH. B. REC. 178 (1975).
34. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 7, at 501 n.15.
35. See M. FAIR & J. GUANDOLO, TRANSPORTATION REGULATION (1976)

(the authors note that increased regulation of the airline industry has become impractical with the growing amount of international travel by Ameri-

can flag carriers); Lazarus, Perspectives and Problems in Regulation of
Domestic Aviation, in R. WEINSTEIN, THE AVIATION INDUSTRY: CURRENT
PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS (1978) (Noting that the trend in aviation regulation is on the downswing the author states that "[In] anagerial decisions
will be made more and more by air carrier management, and less and less
by C.A.B. More competition will exist." Id. at 143).
36. BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 14-15 (5th ed. 1979). See Ketona-Chem.
Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 404 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1969) (" 'Accident' has
been defined to be an unexpected, untoward event which happens without
intention or design."); Koehring Co. v. American Auto Ins. Co., 353 F.2d 993,
996 (2d Cir. 1965) ('rhe word 'accident' refers to the event or occurrence
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an accident results in personal injuries to an individual, no lia37
bility will attach because fault cannot be attributed to another.
The concept of "accident" has a unique meaning, however, in
litigation controlled by the Warsaw Convention. According to
Article 17, it is an accident which triggers the liability of an air
carrier. Because the Convention presumes the liability of the
airline unless due care is shown, 39 an accident is merely defined
as the event causing injury or death to the passenger, regardless
of fault.
40
Governed by well-settled rules of treaty interpretation,
American courts have construed the term "accident" liberally.
Furthermore, it is settled that the plaintiff, to succeed in an action based on the Convention, must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that an accident did in fact occur. 41 Nevertheless, a
functional definition of accident, as it applies to the Convention,
has eluded the courts, and the question has been addressed
case-by-case. 42 Regardless of how the word is defined, there
which produced the damages and does not require that ... upon which the
liability for the damages is predicated.").
37. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 140 (4th ed. 1971).
38. Article 17 of the Convention states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the

death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by

a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took

place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of

embarking or disembarking.
49 Stat. at 3018, T.S. No. 876.
39. 'The effect of Article 17 of the Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement is to create liability regardless of fault or negligence on the
part of the carrier." DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433 F. Supp.
1047, 1051 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
40. As a matter of federal law, treaty interpretation involves a consideration of legislative history and the intent of the contracting parties. See,
e.g., Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943);
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976); Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d
323, 336-38 (5th Cir. 1967).

41. E.g., MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1405 (1st Cir. 1971);

DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433 F. Supp. 1047, 1053 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Scherer v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 54 A. D. 2d 636, 638, 387
N.Y.S.2d 580, 581 (1976).
42. See, e.g., Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256
(9th Cir. 1977) (where the passenger sustains injuries which are too far removed from the area of control of the carrier, there is no accident within the
meaning of the Convention); MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st
Cir. 1971) (Sustained the district court's finding that there was no evidence
of an accident under the Convention. The plaintiff had fallen in the baggage
area immediately after disembarking but failed to prove that she fell as a
result of any action by the carrier. The court held that she could just as
likely have fallen due to her own infirmity since she was 74 years old);
DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airways, 433 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(court defined accident as "the occurrence on board the aircraft ... an unusual or unexpected happening." Id. at 1052. The event or occurrence is not
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must be enough evidence for the jury to find that there was an
43

accident.
Once it's been determined that an accident occurred, Article
17 limits liability of the carrier. (1) if the accident took place on
board the aircraft; or (2) if the accident occurred during embarkation or disembarkation. The plaintiff need only prove that the
accident took place in one of these situations, and that it proximately caused the alleged damages. 44
The interpretation of "on board the aircraft" has not produced much controversy in American courts.4 5 The term has
been applied broadly. An important federal court decision construed it to include "all of the time between embarkation at the
origin of a flight and disembarkation at the scheduled destination of a flight." 46 Taken literally, this definition has enabled the
courts to extend the meaning of Article 17 to hijackings, the
damages for which include47 psychic injury, which is compensable under the Convention.
an accident if it results solely from the state of health of the passenger and
is unconnected with the flight. In this case, the district court found that an
accident had occurred when, due to the change in pressurization of the aircraft, the plaintiff sustained severe injury to his ears.).
43. The following charge to the jury was cited with approval in
DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977):
[An] accident is an event, a physical circumstance, which unexpectedly
takes place not according to the usual course of things. If the event on
board an airplane is an ordinary, expected, and usual occurrence, then
it cannot be termed an accident. To constitute an accident, the occurrence on board the aircraft must be unusual or unexpected, an unusual
or unexpected happening.
The event or occurrence is not an accident if it results solely from

the state of health of the passenger and is unconnected with the flight.
Id. at 1059 (emphasis in original).
44. 49 Stat. at 3018, T.S. No. 876. See note 39 supra.
45. AvIATION TORT LAw, supra note 21, at § 11:33.
46. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1247 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (emphasis added). The court concluded: 'Therefore, all events which
caused the plaintiff's alleged injuries and which occurred during the time
between leaving Zurich and returning to Zurich shall be considered to have
occurred 'on board the aircraft.'" Id. at 1248.

47. E.g., Karflnkel v. Compaignie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971,
977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("It seems the better view that all claims for damages
for personal injuries suffered by a passenger in an accident, whether physical or mental, be resolved in one action under the Convention."); Husserl v.
Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F.Supp. 1238, 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ('That phrase
'death or wounding.., or any other bodily injury, as used in Article 17,
does comprehend mental and psychosomatic injuries.").
Contra, Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M.
1973) (mental injuries alone, which did not result from physical injury, were
not within the purview of Article 17 and not recoverable as part of plaintiff's
damages); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d
848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974) (mental injury as the result of hijacking was not
compensable as bodily injury under Article 17).
For a general treatment of recovery for damages due to hijacking under
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However, determination of what constitutes an accident in
the course of embarkation or disembarkation has been a common issue in international aircrash litigation. While a crash
often results in death, injuries suffered while embarking or disembarking are usually less extensive. Since the revised "Montreal" limitation is $75,000, it may be advantageous in these
cases, as opposed to those resulting in death or severe injury, for
the plaintiffs attorney to assert the applicability of the Convention. Although it is usually a defense asserted by the carrier, the
virtual "strict liability" provisions of the Convention obviate the
need for proof of negligence in a "slip and fall" case where such
fault is extremely difficult to prove. 48 Thus, the liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention may be used offensively to procure a recovery where it might otherwise be impossible.
The most significant case dealing with the definition of embarkation is the 1975 Fifth Circuit decision, Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. 49 Several passengers were injured or killed in a
terrorist attack at Hellenikon Airport in Athens, Greece.50 The
victims, all international passengers under Article 1, were waiting to be searched before boarding the plane when the "accident" occurred. The plaintiffs sought to characterize this event
as an accident while in the course of embarkation. Finding for
the plaintiffs, the court stated that this activity was within the
purview of Article 17 of the Convention. In determining the parameters of embarkation and disembarkation, the Day court rejected a strict "locality rule."'5 1 Recognizing that a broad
construction of Article 17 would better harmonize with modern
theories of accident cost allocation, Judge Kaufman propounded
a tripartite test inquiring into three areas: (1) Activity (What
were the plaintiffs doing?); (2) Control (At whose direction?);
the Convention, see Annot., 72 AJL.R.3d 1299 (1976). See also Note, Recovery
for Mental Anguish Under the Warsaw Convention, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 333
(1975).
48. AvIATION TORT LAw, supra note 21, at § 11:33. The authors note that
in situations where the passenger sustains injury in the course of embarkation or disembarkation, "[i]
f Article 17 were not applicable, the passengers

could recover - if at all - only by maintaining a costly suit .... The expense and inconvenience of such litigation would be compounded by the
need to prove fault and the requirements of extensive pretrial investigation,
travel and other factors too difficult to anticipate." See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
49. 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
50. Situations involving terrorist attacks on airports have been the focus
of much of the litigation which has shaped the present day construction of
"embarkation" and "disembarkation" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. See Annot., 36 A.L.R. Fed. 490 (1978). See also AVIATION TORT LAw,
supra note 21, at 733-36.
51. 528 F.2d at 33.
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(3) Location (Where did the accident occur?). 5 2 These criteria
courts adjudicathave subsequently been well-received by other
53
cases.
disembarkation
and
ing embarkation
Since Day, courts have refused to use a strict geographical
approach in deciding whether an accident was within Article
17.54 Though the Day test has proved favorable to plaintiffs in
cases hinging on "embarkation," this has not been true where
55
accidents in the course of disembarkation have been litigated.
Embarkation is a more readily defined procedure. The embarking passenger is required to report to a certain point, go through
customs and security checks, and generally to conduct himself
according to the ritual for boarding an airplane. Disembarking,
however, is significantly subject to less control by the carrier.
Thus, the degree of control distinguishes embarkation from disembarkation under Article 17, and that distinction presents a
formidable obstacle to recovery where plaintiff's injury occurs
after his departure from the aircraft.
Yet for the lawyer involved in international air litigation involving injuries sustained by a "non-crash" accident, the Warsaw Convention and its strict liability provisions can be an aid to
recovery. Without the burden of proving negligence, the prospect of an award is promising. The extent of "slip and fall" injuries do not make the $75,000 ceiling burdensome. However,
where the accident involved is an air disaster with deaths and
severe injuries the likely result, the plaintiff's lawyer must seek
to avoid the strictures of the Warsaw Convention.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d
Cir. 1977) (The plaintiffs injuries arose out of the same facts as in Day. The

tripartite test was applied and plaintiff recovered under the Convention);
Upton v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 450 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Day test
applied to situation where plaintiff was killed when roof collapsed at
Mehrabad International Airport, Tehran, Iran); Leppo v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 56 A.D.2d 813, 392 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1977) (Day test cited with approval in case involving the same incident in Athens, Greece).
54. See note 53 supra.
55. Accidents occurring in the airport terminals after disembarkation
have uniformly been held not "in the course of operation of disembarking."
AVIATION TORT LAw, supra note 21, at § 11:33.
See Martinez-Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976)
(Plaintiffs were injured after leaving airplane and waiting for their belongings in baggage area of terminal. Court here applied the three-part Day test

and concluded that due to the lack of control over plaintiffs by carrier, accident was not in the course of "disembarking.").
For a more complete treatment of the case law which has developed
under Article 17 and the construction of "embarking" and "disembarking,"
see Annot., 39 A.L.R. Fed. 452 (1978); Note, Warsaw Convention - Air CarrierLiabilityfor PassengerInjuries Sustained Within a Terminal, 45 FORDHAM L.REv. 369 (1976).
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3: SOME EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARSAW LIMITATIONS
The Requirement of Delivery

The plaintiff's attorney in any air disaster case must examine the contract of carriage. Because it represents the intent
of the parties, this contract will determine whether the passenger was an international traveller under Article 1 of the Warsaw
Convention. Furthermore, other information concerning the
passenger's ticket may be an indispensable tool in avoiding restrictions imposed by the Convention and securing maximum
recovery for the plaintiff.
Article 3 of the Convention requires that the carrier deliver
the ticket to the passenger and that the ticket of passage contain
certain information. 56 Failure to complete delivery prevents the
carrier from asserting the liability protections of the Convention
as a defense in the event of an accident.5 7 The litigator's attention should be focused on the applicability of this exception as it
58
has been the source of much litigation.
Generally, the courts have viewed the element of delivery of
the ticket as part of an affirmative defense of the carrier requiring substantiation by competent evidence.59 Once proved, deliv56. Article 3(1) provides that:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a
passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that
if he exercises that right, the alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the transportation of its international character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability established by this convention.
49 Stat. at 3015, T.S. No. 876.
57. Article 3(2) provides:
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall
not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transportation,
which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this convention.
Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger
ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of
those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Id.
58. Much of the hardest fought litigation, at appellate and trial levels in
the reported decisions, has involved the construction, application and effect
of Article 3. Dispute has centered on the provisions that a passenger ticket
must contain, the requirement of delivery, and the adequacy and sufficiency
of the ticket's "notice" that the transportation is subject to Convention rules
relating to liability. AVIATION TORT LAw, supra note 21, at § 11:35.
59. See DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433 F. Supp. 1047, 1061
(E.D. Pa. 1977) ("It is the carrier's burden to establish sufficient delivery to
enable it to limit recoverable damages."); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree
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ery is not vitiated by a showing that the ticket did not conform to
every detail set out in Article 3(1).60 One of these "details,"
however, has received strict judicial scrutiny and will not be
waived if the carrier alleges the Convention as a defense.
The Necessity of Notice
The federal courts have adopted the view that the severe
limitations on recovery can only be justified if the passenger receives notice of them. 61 The rationale is that the passenger
should be apprised of his potential loss of rights so that he may
secure additional accident protection. 62 This concept of notice
to the passenger is embodied in subsection (1) (e) of Article 3,
which requires "a statement that the transportation is subject to
the rules relating to liability established by this Convention."
The courts have construed 1(e) as requiring a timely delivery of
the ticket allowing the passenger adequate time to discover his
63
redefined rights of recovery in the event of an accident.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Italiane, 253 F. Supp. 237, 243 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966),
affd, 390 U.S. 455 (1968) (equally divided Court) (court refers to the Convention as an affirmative defense requiring a showing of proof of delivery);
Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1949),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955) ("There is no need for a carrier who claims
the limitations to show more than the delivery of an appropriate ticket.").
60. Subsection (2) of Article 3 specifically states that the irregularity of
the passenger ticket shall not affect the validity of the contract for carriage
and its international character. See note 57 supra. See Grey v. American
Airlines, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (court held that, in accordance
with the language of Article 3(2), fact that the passenger ticket did not contain all "stop overs" during flight did not affect validity of contract for carriage and that airline could assert the Convention in defense of suit.);
accord, Rosen v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 10 Av. Cas. 17,314 (1966).
61. See, e.g., Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.
1965); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965); Seth v.
BOAC, 329 F.2d 302 (1st Cir. 1964).
62. Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1965)
('The purpose of such a statement is to notify passengers of the applicability of the Convention, thus affording them the opportunity to take steps to
protect against the limitation of liability.").
63. The Warren court held that the delivery of the ticket to the passenger must be such that he has a "reasonable opportunity" to take protective
measures. Accord, Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 857 (2d
Cir. 1965); Demanes v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 10 Av. Cas. 17,611 (N.D. Cal.
1967); Glassman v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 10 Av. Cas. 18296 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
Contra, Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880
(1949), cert. denied sub nom., 349 U.S. 947 (1955). The evidence at trial
showed that the ticket had been laid on a table in front of the plaintiff
whose travel arrangements were made by an employee of the United Service Organization in whose show the plaintiff was appearing. The fact that
she had seen the ticket and later boarded the aircraft was construed as an
implied ratification of the limitations contained therein, and she was held to
the Warsaw limits in her recovery against the airlines.
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set the standard of adequacy for the required notice on the ticket in Lisi v. Alitalia Airlines, Inc.64 This court noted that it
would be pointless to demand that the plaintiff receive notice of
the Convention if the notice would not be recognized as such by
the ordinary passenger. Though its decision was not based on
traditional contract principles, the court recognized that the
placement of notice of the Convention's applicability in "lilliputian print in a thicket of 'conditions of contact'" was unconscion65
able.
The Lisi decision has been followed in subsequent cases involving the size, location, and color contrast of print of the "notice" statement.6 6 The Montreal Interim Agreement has
adopted the approach of the Second Circuit and, the result has
67
been standardization of such notice on contracts for carriage.
It has not been settled, however, whether the notice issue
should be resolved by reference to an objective standard, i.e.,
notice most reasonably calculated under the circumstances to
inform the passenger, or whether actual subjective notice is required. The attitude of the courts regarding the Montreal Interim Agreement will be the decisive factor. In any event, the
notice provisions of the Agreement have been held to satisfy the
requirements of the Convention. 68 Issues of delivery and notice,
however, continue to be raised by the plaintiffs' bar as effective
means of circumventing the Convention.
WILFUL MISCONDUCT: AN ISSUE OF FACT

Perhaps the best-known exception to the liability limits of
the Warsaw Convention is wilful misconduct attributed to the
airline. Article 25, which was not altered by the Montreal Agreement,69 provides that the carrier shall not be entitled to avail
64. Lisi v. Alitalia Airlines, Inc., 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), affd, 390 U.S.
455 (1968) (passenger tickets in form of small printed booklets, which was
standard airline practice, would no longer be sufficient to notify passengers
that the exclusion or limitation provisions of the Warsaw Convention were
applicable, and thus defendant airline could not assert Article 22 as a defense).
65. Id. at 514.
66. E.g., Burdell v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 10 Av. Cas. 18,251 (7th
Cir. 1968). See note 80-86 and accompanying text infra.
67. The Montreal Agreement, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970) provides that notice be given: (1) in 10 point modern type; (2) in contrasting color; (3) on
each ticket; (4) each piece of paper attached to the ticket (or) on the ticket
envelope.
68. E.g., Milliken Trust Co. v. Iberia Lineas de Espana, 11 Av. Cas. 17,333
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
69. The Montreal Agreement does not affect the "wilful misconduct" exception in Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention. KREINDLER, supra note 2,
at § 12A.07(1). However, it should be noted that those cases which are con-
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itself of the liability limits of the Convention if the accident was
proximately caused by its "wilful misconduct. '70 Because Article 25(1) allows wilful misconduct to be defined in accordance
with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, 7' the
construction of wilful misconduct has not been uniform. Thus,
strictly local definitions of wilful misconduct, as they may be applied to automobile death statutes or workmen's compensation
acts, may play a part in defining international law.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the accident
occurred due to the wilful misconduct of the carrier. 72 Courts
are reluctant from taking the matter of wilful misconduct away
from the triers of fact.7 3 Thus, the jury instruction defining wil-

ful misconduct is of obvious importance and requires detailed
consideration by any attorney involved in aviation litigation.
One New York court has determined that a finding of wilful
misconduct requires that the pilot or other employee of the carrier 74 have intended the harmful result, or must have done the

trolled by the Hague Protocol may be affected by the provisions on that
document. In place of "wilful misconduct," it substitutes the following provision: "The limits of liability specified in Article XXII shall not apply if it is
proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, its
servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result.. . ." Hague Protocol, art.
XIII. 2 INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRVATE Am LAw 10 (Doc. 7686-LC/140) (1956), S. EXEC. Doc.
No. H., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 16 (1959).
70. Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as,
in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted,
is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
(2) Similarly, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
said provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances
by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.
49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876.
71. Id.

72. E.g., Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963),

cert. denied, 375 U.S. 895 (1964); In re Air Crash in Bali Indonesia, 462 F.
Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978); In re Pago Pago Air Crash of Jan. 30, 1974, 419 F.

Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 281
A. D. 105, 117 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1952).

See also Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.

denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956); Pekeles v. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., 187
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).

73. See, e.g., Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282, 286 (2d Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956).
74. Article 25(2) states: "[T]he carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his
employment." 49 Stat. at 3020, T.S. No. 876. See note 70 supra. In Reed v.
Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit held that the Warsaw
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act with the knowledge that injurious consequences were probable.7 5 Under such a standard, plaintiff would be required to
show tht the pilot intended to destroy the airplane and injure
the plaintiff. Fortunately for plaintiffs, the clear majority of
courts do not take this approach.
Most of the jury charges which have been approved by fedand
eral courts focus on the "wilful" aspect of the misconduct
76
require a conscious act or intentional omission of duty. Most
courts agree that a "reckless and wanton disregard of probable
consequences" is sufficient misconduct.7 7 In any event, the finding of wilful misconduct, however it is defined in a particular jurisdiction, remains an effective means of vitiating the limits of
the Convention.
The wilful misconduct issue often offers a particularly potent argument for a plaintiff because the jury may determine it
at the same time it considers damages. Clearly, if the damages
proven by the plaintiff are significantly in excess of the Convention's limitations, as they usually are, the jury may resolve the
wilful misconduct issue in the plaintiff's favor. To limit the recovery of a severely injured plaintiff to $75,000, when his proven
damages are in excess of $500,000, may appear unconscionable
to the ordinary juror. Together the requirements of delivery and
notice and the provisions concerning the carrier's wilful misconduct comprise the treaty's internal avoidance mechanisms.
Other arguments embodied in the Constitution and traditional
contract principles draw support from beyond the scope of the
Warsaw Convention.
THE CONSTITUTIONALrTY OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION

To the extent that the plaintiff's injuries are the result of an
event which does not appear to be an accident within the meaning of Article 17, his attorney should be prepared to allege the
applicability of the Convention. The availability of the Convention's strict liability provisions may be indispensable to the
plaintiff's case in such instances where proof of negligence is adConvention's liability limits applied to suits against the agents, officers, and
employees of the carrier for acts within the scope of their employment.
75. Reiner v. Alitalia Airlines, 9 Av. Cas. 18,228 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
76. See, e.g., Grey v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956); Pekelis v. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., 187
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951); American Airlines, Inc. v. Ullen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C.
Cir. 1949); Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, 281 A. D. 105, 117 N.Y.S. 2d
276 (1952).
77. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 533 (1955); Barrel,
A New Approach to the Problem of Wilful and Wanton Misconduct, 1949 INS.

LJ.716, 723 (1949).
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mittedly unobtainable. Generally, however, the attorney will
not want to align himself with the Convention and its harsh recovery limits.
In recent years, plaintiffs have assiduously argued before
state and federal courts that the damage limitations of Article
22(1) violate a number' of constitutional provisions. However,
the courts have evaded these constitutional questions and based
their decisions on other grounds. 78 Only four American courts
have actually passed on the constitutionality of the Warsaw
Convention.7 9 One of these, a 1968 Illinois case, Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines,8" actually held the Convention unconstitutional. The Burdell decision rested primarily on due process
and equal protection grounds. Although its reasoning was
sound, the decision has had little impact because the trial court
decided these constitutional issues only after disposing of 8the
1
merits on the ground that the Convention was inapplicable.
Despite the impropriety of deciding the constitutional issues, Judge Nicholas J. Bua decided to lay the groundwork for8 a2
constitutional assault on the Convention in future litigation.
78. See, e.g., Molitch v. Irish Int'l. Airlines, 436 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1970)
(plaintiff did not properly raise question of constitutionality, therefore, issue not addressed on appeal); In re Pago Pago Aircrash of Jan. 30, 1974, 419

F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (case disposed of on issue of wilful misconduct, constitutional issue never reached); Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc.,
15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E. 2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1964) (court did not discuss
constitutional allegations, found for plaintiff on other grounds).
79. Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957) (Convention's liability limitation held constitutional in the face of allegations
that it deprived plaintiff of Seventh Amendment right to jury determination
on damages issue); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America v. Pan American Airlines, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (due process rights of insurance
carriers were not violated by Convention's limitations providing for presumption of liability); Garcia v. Pan American Airlines, Inc., 269 A. D. 287, 55
N.Y.S. 2d 317 (1945), af'd per curiam, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257 (1946)
(Convention is constitutional as valid treaty).
Cir. Ct. 1968). The decision was later revised
80. 10 Av. Cas. 18,151 (Ill.
by the trial judge in 11 Av. Cas. 17,351 (1969).
81. The Burdell court held that the deceased passenger was not engaged in international travel as defined by Article 1(2). The court found
that the points of departure and destination (Singapore) were not, in fact,
adherents to the Convention at the time of the accident. 10 Av. Cas. at
18,154.

For excellent opposing discussions of the propriety and validity of the
Burdell case, compare Hay, Comments on Burdell v. CanadianPacificAirlines and the Constitutionalityof the Warsaw Convention, 58 ILL.B.J. 26
(1970) with Kennelly, Response to Comments on Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, 58 ILL. B.J. 329 (1970).
82. "The Court feels it would be remiss if it did not pass upon these
alternative [constitutional] arguments which may now have relevance and
most certainly will have relevance in the future of this litigation." 10 Av.
Cas. at 18,155 (emphasis added).
Judge Bua felt obliged to write a subsequent opinion admitting the lack
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He recognized the severe limitations on plaintiffs' recovery as
violative of the due process and just compensation clauses of
the fifth amendment. 83 The once appropriate limit on recovery
was said to have no place in today's system of compensation.
Furthermore, Judge Bua felt that the airlines should be accorded no more preferential treatment in cases of air disasters
than the airplane manufacturers or the United States govern84
ment, whose liability is not affected by the Convention.
The Warsaw Convention was also found to abridge equal
protection rights under the fourteenth amendment. The court
characterized Article 22 and its provisions as "arbitrary, irresponsible, capricious and indefensible . . .in that such provisions would attempt to impose a damage limitation of
considerably less than the undisputed pecuniary losses and
damages involved.18 5 Though Burdell has not been effectively
argued as authority in any subsequent case, its reasoning could
be used to support an assault on the constitutional integrity of
the Convention's restrictions. In any event, the decision stands
as a potent reminder that the Treaty is not unassailable and
86
must conform to the dictates of the United States Constitution.
CALIFORNIA ATTACK VIA CONTRACT ANALYSIS

Another basis for a rejection of Warsaw's application may
be gaining impetus. A California federal court recently attacked
the supremacy of the Treaty's provisions by applying a strict
contract analysis to the operation of the liability provisions as
87
they relate to an action under the state wrongful death statute.
In essence, the court found that the nature of the liability limitations of the Convention is contractual. The court ruled that the
of necessity for his decision in light of the actual case disposition, but reaffirming his belief that the damage limitations were unconstitutional. 11 Av.
Cas. at 17,354. Judge Bua now sits in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois.
83. "The Court finds that the Warsaw Convention Treaty and any treaty,
is subject to the Constitution of the United States, and any provision of a
treaty which purports to take away a right of a citizen, provided for by the
Constitution, is invalid as to that citizen." 10 Av. Cas. at 18,157.
84. Id. at 18,162.

85. Id.
86. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 620 (1870) stated: "It need
hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid
if it be in violation of that instrument. This results from the natural and
fundamental principles of our government."
87. In re Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
Although the decedent was an international passenger and all the elements
of the defense of the Convention were present, the district court held that
recovery could not be limited by Article 22. Instead, the court held that the
California wrongful death statute would govern damages.
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contract between the deceased passenger and the air carrier
could not limit or extinguish the independent cause of action of
the passenger's estate.8 8 This reasoning has not been evaluated
by appellate review or in other trial court decisions. However,
the contract argument is appealing and is another weapon for
the plaintiffs attorney to use in securing just compensation in
international air crash litigation.
CONCLUSION

The complexities of air crash litigation are nowhere more
apparent than in the issue of damages. Where the passenger's
ticket brings him under the provisions of the Warsaw Convention and its progeny, his attorney must be prepared to marshall
a variety of arguments, or be content with an award which may
be far less than the damages which were proved. Just compensation is clearly not the norm in international aviation law.
Finally, it should be noted that an international agreement
which would significantly alter the state of the law under the
Warsaw Convention and its amending documents has been proposed. The Guatemala Agreement, 89 which has been before the
88. The Bali court said.

It is a settled California rule that its wrongful death statute creates an
original cause of action not derived from any rights the decedent may

have had .... Because of the separate and original nature of this
wrongful death action, a decedent, while he is alive, cannot contract
away or compromise the wrongful death cause of action, nor effectively
release from wrongful death liability a potential defendant .... [Any]

contract of carriage pursuant to which a decedent purports to limit the
right to recover for his death therefore cannot affect this cause of action
(under the California wrongful death statute).
462 F. Supp. at 1117.
Contra, Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801
(N.D. Ga. 1964), aff'd, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967). The Block court stated:
Georgia public policy does not control these actions. Federal public
policy controls, and Federal public policy authorizes limitations of liability in international transportation by aircraft as shown by the United
States' adherence to the Warsaw Convention. Federal public policy authorizes limitations of liability in international air transportation by aircraft in the amount of $8,300 .... Regardless of the consequences, this

Court is bound by the Treaty, the decisions, and the public policy established by the Treaty.

Id. at 810-11.

89. The Guatemala Protocol was completed and signed in that city on
March 8, 1971. Its official title is "Protocol to Amend the Conventionfor the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air
Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at
the Hague on 28 September 1955. It is not yet the law in any place, since it is

incapable of becoming effective until ratification by the United States has
occurred. It does not seem likely to be ratified in its present form.
The new treaty would increase the maximum liability for damages for

injury or death to a flat $100,000. The liability would be absolute; require no
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Senate for ratification since 1971, would increase the liability of
the carrier to $100,000. The price to the international traveler,
however, is that this limit is inflexible regardless of whether
there was delivery of the ticket, notice, or wilful misconduct. If
ratified, this new body of international law will surely be accepted no more willingly by the plaintilf's bar than was the Warsaw Convention.

notice to the passenger; and make no exception for wilful misconduct. Interestingly, however, if wilful misconduct is proved in an action for cargo
loss, the maximum is upset and the true damage suffered may be compensed. Such distinctions have incurred the disfavor of the commentators.
See KREINDLER, supranote 2, at § 12B.01; Kennelly, Aviation Law: International Air Travel - A Brief Diagnosisand Prognosis, 56 Cm. B. Ruc. 194
(1978). The Treaty would not impair an airline's right of recourse against
another tortfeasor, such as a manufacturer, but would insulate the other
tortfeasor's right against the airlines if the effect would be to increase liability over $100,000.00.

